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 Securities fraud cases are an exception to the permissive pleading rules of federal 
courts. the general pleading standard for a federal case is the “plausibility” standard 
announced by the United States Supreme court in Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly.1 
the fact that securities fraud cases require a deviation from the normally uniform 
pleading standards evidences their unique nature and the delicate balance a court 
must strike in considering them. on one hand, a court must weigh the important 
public interests in protecting shareholders from the fraudulent conduct of corporate 
officers and directors, and in providing purchasers with a remedy for injuries related 
to such conduct. on the other hand, a court must consider an equally important 
interest in protecting corporations from baseless strike suits filed by opportunists 
looking to make a quick buck.2 Faced with the prospect of expensive discovery, 
reputational damage, and a potentially enormous damages award, corporate 
defendants have a great incentive to settle even non-meritorious cases.3 a long line of 
Second circuit precedent, culminating with the Supreme court’s decision in Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,4 has recognized that the inherent risk of abuse in 
securities fraud cases is unique and that heightened pleading standards are a  necessary 
screening mechanism to keep frivolous suits from proceeding.5 However, in June 
2008, the Second circuit announced a rule that undermines the well-established 
heightened pleading standards for securities fraud cases, and threatens to upset the 
balance struck by prior court decisions.
 in Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., the 
Second circuit granted an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order in a 
securities fraud case, and granted, in part, the defendant’s motion to dismiss.6 though 
the Second circuit vacated the district court’s order,7 finding scienter not adequately 
pled against the corporate defendants,8 the Second circuit agreed with the district 
court’s finding that it is possible for a plaintiff to plead a corporate defendant’s 
scienter (“corporate scienter”) without adequately pleading the scienter of any 
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). the “plausibility” standard requires a plaintiff to plead “enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
2. a “strike suit” is “[a] suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid claim, brought either for 
nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inf lated settlement. Black’s Law Dictionary 
1475 (8th ed. 2004). See novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d cir. 2000) (noting “the ‘inevitable 
tension’ between the interests in deterring securities fraud and deterring strike suits.”).
3. Michael a. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ill. L. rev. 913, 921 
(2003).
4. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
5. in fact, the “strong inference” pleading standard, adopted by congress in the Private Securities 
Litigation reform act and interpreted by the United States Supreme court in Tellabs, originated in the 
Second circuit. Id. at 320 (citing ross v. a.H. robins co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d cir. 1979)).
6. teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex capital inc. 531 F.3d 190, 197 (2d cir. 
2008).
7. Id. at 197.
8. Id.
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individually named defendant.9 the Second circuit defines “scienter” as “intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud,10 or reckless conduct,”11 and it is the state of mind 
necessary for liability in a securities fraud action. this case comment contends that 
the new “corporate scienter”12 pleading rule establishes a lower pleading threshold for 
corporate scienter in contradiction to well-established, heightened standards for 
pleading scienter, thereby undermining legislative and judicial efforts aimed at 
ensuring the dismissal of meritless suits.
 During March and august of 1999, defendant Merit Securities corp. (“Merit”), 
through its subsidiary Dynex capital inc. (“Dynex”), a financial services company, 
issued two sets of secured bonds, the Series 12 Bonds and the Series 13 Bonds, using 
as collateral a pool of home loans it had made over the previous three years.13 as the 
value of the collateral began to decline due to defaults on the loans, defendant Dynex 
was forced to make two disclosures, the first in october 2003 and the second in 
april 2004.14 the first disclosure indicated that Dynex had understated its 
repossession rates on the loans backing the Series 13 Bonds by 34%, and the second 
disclosure referred to an internal control deficiency that would result in a restatement 
of Dynex’s previously reported earnings for two periods in 2003.15 Following these 
disclosures, the prices of the Series 12 and 13 Bonds decreased dramatically, some by 
as much as 85%.16
 in the wake of these price drops, plaintiff teamsters Local 445 Freight Division 
Pension Fund (“teamsters”), which had invested approximately $450,000 in the 
Series 13 Bonds,17 filed a class action in the United States District court for the 
Southern District of new York in February 2005.18 the complaint named both Merit 
and Dynex as defendants (the “corporate defendants”), as well as Stephan Benedetti, 
president and cEo of Merit, and thomas Potts, president and principle executive 
officer of Dynex (the “individual defendants”). teamsters alleged violations of section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange act of 1934.19
9. Id. at 195. 
10. atSi commc’ns, inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 n.3 (2d cir. 2007) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976)).
11. atSi commc’ns, inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 n.3 (2d cir. 2007) (citing In re carter-
Wallace, inc. Sec. Litig., 220 F.3d 36, 39 (2d cir. 2000)).
12. In re Dynex capital inc. Sec. Litig., no. 05 civ. 1879, 2006 WL 1517580, at *3 (S.D.n.Y. June 2, 
2006).
13. Dynex, 531 F.3d at 192.
14. Id. at 192–93.
15. Id. at 193.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. In re Dynex capital inc. Sec. Litig., no. 05 civ. 1879, 2006 WL 314524, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. Feb. 10, 
2006).
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 Section 10(b) sets out the basic cause of action for securities fraud and provides: 
“it shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative . . . device or contrivance.”20 
the Securities and Exchange commission has further defined the prohibited 
conduct under section 10(b) by promulgating rule 10b-5, which states:
it shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading.21
 the requirement of scienter has been read into securities fraud actions under 
section 10(b) by the United States Supreme court.22
 Plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud under section 10(b) fell into two general categories: 
(1) Dynex’s failure to disclose its practice of buying high-risk loans to use as collateral 
for the bonds, and (2) defendants’ misrepresentations relating to the true reason for 
the collateral’s decrease in value.23 Defendants moved to dismiss, alleging, inter alia, 
that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead scienter.24
 in considering the motion to dismiss, the district court reiterated the well-
established rule that in order to plead scienter by alleging reckless conduct, plaintiffs 
must specifically identify documents that defendants had access to that demonstrate 
the falsity of defendants’ public statements.25 the court held that scienter was not 
adequately pled as to the individual defendants because plaintiffs had alleged a 
scheme of corporate recklessness, but failed to connect that recklessness to either of 
the individual defendants. Specifically, the court found that plaintiffs failed to allege 
facts showing that the individual defendants had access to information or documents 
that demonstrated Dynex’s public statements were false.26 However, the court also 
held that a plaintiff need not plead scienter of a corporation’s individual agents in 
order to successfully plead scienter of the corporation.27 the court concluded that 
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a systematic corporate scheme to issue defective 
loans, and that the scheme constituted strong circumstantial evidence of recklessness 
on the part of Dynex and Merit.28 thus, the court held that scienter was adequately 
pled as to the corporate defendants.29
20. 15 U.S.c. § 78j (2006).
21. 17 c.F.r. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
22. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
23. Dynex, 2006 WL 314524, at *1.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *9 (citing novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d cir. 2000)).
26. Dynex, 2006 WL 314524, at *9.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *9–10.
29. Id. at *10.
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 the corporate defendants subsequently moved for reconsideration of the district 
court’s order, or alternately, for leave to bring an interlocutory appeal.30 Defendants 
argued that the district court’s approval of the so-called “corporate scienter” pleading 
theory was improper.31 the court held that defendants had demonstrated that the 
issue of pleading corporate scienter was a “controlling question of law as to which 
there is [a] substantial ground for difference of opinion [and] . . . an [immediate] 
appeal . . . [may] materially advance the [ultimate] termination of [the] litigation”32 
and that the issue was thus ripe for interlocutory appeal.33 the court granted leave 
for such appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1292(b).34
 on interlocutory appeal, the Second circuit agreed with the district court that, 
as a matter of law, a plaintiff may plead corporate scienter without successfully 
pleading the scienter of named individuals within the corporation whose scienter 
may be ascribed to the corporation.35 the court noted that under the Private Securities 
Litigation reform act of 1995 (“PSLra”), a complaint must give rise to a “strong 
inference” of scienter or face dismissal.36 this “strong inference” was interpreted by 
the United States Supreme court in Tellabs to mean that an inference of scienter 
must be at least as strong and compelling as any opposing inference.37 Plaintiffs 
contended they had adequately pled scienter based on a theory of recklessness by (1) 
alleging that Dynex had access to information contradicting its public statements, 
and (2) alleging that defendants neglected information that they had a duty to 
monitor.38 the court dismissed both arguments as inadequate for the same reason: 
the complaint did not specifically identify the particular documents that contained 
information showing the falsity of Dynex’s public statements as required by the 
Second circuit in Novak v. Kasaks39 in order to plead recklessness.40 concluding that 
the inference of recklessness was not at least as strong as any opposing inferences of 
non-fraudulent intent, the court found that the Tellabs standard had not been satisfied 
and held that since the complaint did not adequately plead scienter on the part of the 
corporate defendants, the complaint must be dismissed under the PSLra.
 in Dynex, the Second circuit held that, as a matter of law, it is possible for a 
plaintiff to adequately plead scienter on the part of a corporation without pleading 
30. Id. at *1.
31. Id. at *2.
32. Id. at *3 (citation and quotations omitted).
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex capital inc. 531 F.3d 190, 192 (2d cir. 2008).
36. Id. at 194.
37. 551 U.S. at 314.
38. Dynex, 531 F.3d at 196.
39. 216 F.3d at 309.
40. Dynex, 531 F.3d at 196.
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scienter on the part of a specific officer or employee of the corporation whose scienter 
could be imputed to the corporation.41 this rule contradicts existing heightened 
standards for pleading scienter by announcing a lower threshold for plaintiffs to meet 
in order to plead corporate scienter and therefore undermines legislative and judicial 
efforts to encourage dismissal of frivolous suits at the pleading stage.
 the PSLra establishes a high standard for pleading scienter, requiring that a 
plaintiff “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”42 in Tellabs, the United States 
Supreme court interpreted a “strong inference” of scienter as one that is at least as 
strong and compelling as any plausible opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent 
that could be drawn from the facts.43 the Second circuit recognizes recklessness as 
a sufficient state of mind to constitute scienter.44 reckless conduct is defined as:
[a]t the least, conduct which is “highly unreasonable” and which represents 
“an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care . . . to the extent 
that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the 
defendant must have been aware of it.”45
 a plaintiff can plead recklessness by showing that defendant either (1) “knew facts or 
had access to information suggesting that his or her public statements were not accurate,” 
or (2) “failed to check information he or she had a duty to monitor.”46 additionally, in 
order to plead recklessness in either of these two ways, a plaintiff must: (a) specifically 
identify the particular documents to which defendant had access that show defendant’s 
public statements were false,47 and (b) demonstrate that an individual defendant’s 
knowledge is based on more than merely his position as a corporate officer or director.48
 the corporate scienter pleading theory allows a plaintiff to plead scienter on the 
part of a corporation without successfully pleading scienter against any of the 
individual agents of the corporation who act on its behalf.49 this rule plainly 
contradicts Second circuit pleading requirements. courts in the Second circuit have 
not allowed plaintiffs to plead recklessness simply by alleging that an individually 
named defendant had a position in the corporate hierarchy and therefore must have 
known enough to know the statement was false.50 the corporate scienter pleading 
41. Id. at 192.
42. 15 U.S.c. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
43. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323–24.
44. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F.3d at 99 n.3.
45. Novak, 216 F.3d at 308 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 311.
47. Id. at 309.
48. In re Health Mgmt. Sys., inc. Sec. Litig., no. 97 civ. 1865, 1998 WL 283286, at *6 (S.D.n.Y. June 1, 
1998).
49. Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 192.
50. In re Health Mgmt. Sys., 1998 WL 283286, at *6.
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rule goes one step further than the situation the courts have already disallowed: it 
allows a plaintiff to plead recklessness by alleging that some unnamed individual 
within the corporate hierarchy must have known enough to know the statement was 
false. clearly, this rule does not comply with the particularity requirements that a 
plaintiff identify documents to which defendant had access that show the defendant’s 
statements were false, and that defendant’s knowledge (of falsity) be based on more 
than simply his particular position in the corporate hierarchy.51
 as its primary reasoning in support of its adoption of the corporate scienter 
pleading rule, the Second circuit quoted a Seventh circuit hypothetical example 
demonstrating a situation where the rule would be appropriate:
[i]t is possible to draw a strong inference of corporate scienter without being 
able to name the individuals who concocted and disseminated the fraud. 
Suppose General Motors announced that it had sold one million SUVs in 
2006, and the actual number was zero. there would be a strong inference of 
corporate scienter, since so dramatic an announcement would have been 
approved by corporate officials sufficiently knowledgeable about the company 
to know that the announcement was false.52
 it may be true that in a factual situation such as the one set forth by the Seventh 
circuit, there is a strong inference of corporate scienter. But there are several f laws in 
the Second circuit’s use of the hypothetical in support of its adoption of the corporate 
scienter pleading rule. First, the Second circuit gives no explanation of why it is 
possible to draw a strong inference of scienter in the hypothetical situation—except 
to assert that the announcement would be so “dramatic” it must have been known by 
corporate officials—and thus no guidance as to when the corporate scienter pleading 
rule may apply. Second, the hypothetical relies on the very reasoning that the Second 
circuit scienter pleading rules have disallowed. By arguing that GM’s announcement 
would be so “dramatic” that it must have been approved by officials sufficiently 
knowledgeable to know that it was false, the Seventh circuit uses exactly the sort of 
“someone-must-have-known” reasoning that the Second circuit has expressly 
prohibited.
 therefore, post Dynex, when deciding whether to bring a securities fraud suit, 
plaintiffs must hazard a guess as to whether the statements at issue in their cases are 
sufficiently “dramatic” to warrant an exception from the particularity pleading 
requirements. and if they guess incorrectly, their complaints will be dismissed for 
the same reason the complaint in Dynex was dismissed. in Dynex, despite the fact 
that the district court found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a systematic 
corporate scheme to issue defective loans, that the scheme constituted strong 
circumstantial evidence of recklessness on the part of Dynex and Merit,53 and the 
51. Id.
52. Dynex, 531 F.3d at 195–96 (quoting Makor issues & rights, Ltd. v. tellabs, inc., 513 F.3d 
702, 710 (7th cir. 2008)).
53. Id. at 194.
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arguably highly “dramatic” announcement that Dynex had understated its repossession 
rates by 34%, the Second circuit did not allow plaintiffs to rely on the corporate 
scienter pleading rule. instead the court applied the particularity pleading rules and 
found that the complaint did not specifically identify the particular documents that 
contained information contradicting Dynex’s public statements.54 therefore, the 
court found the inference of corporate scienter insufficient to satisfy the Tellabs strong 
inference standard.55 the court reasoned: “teamsters would have us infer that someone 
whose scienter is imputable to the corporate defendants and who was responsible for 
the statements made was at least reckless toward the alleged falsity of those 
statements.”56 the court went on to say that such an inference is not at least as 
compelling as the opposing inference that the statements were simply careless 
mistakes by management based on incorrect information it received from below.57 
 the Second circuit’s reasoning on this point was correct, but the court did not 
address the fact that, by definition, the corporate scienter pleading rule allows 
plaintiffs to rely on the very inference the court found inadequate. By allowing 
plaintiffs to plead scienter on the part of the corporation without pleading scienter 
against any corporate agents, the corporate scienter rule asks courts to infer that 
some unidentified agent of the corporation, whose scienter could be imputed to the 
corporation, and who was responsible for the statements made, was at least reckless 
toward the falsity of the statements. the court ignores the necessary implication that 
in the majority of cases where a plaintiff relies on the rule to plead a corporation’s 
scienter—without identifying the specific individuals whose scienter can be imputed 
to the corporation—the inference of corporate scienter will be tenuous. there may be 
an exception for a very narrow set of situations such as the one put forth by the 
Seventh circuit in which the corporation’s statement is sufficiently “dramatic” or 
extreme that a strong inference of corporate scienter arises without pleading scienter 
against specific individuals. But the Second circuit does not acknowledge the 
corporate scienter pleading rule as an exception, or as inconsistent with the existing 
pleading rules, and gives little guidance as to when a plaintiff may rely on the rule. 
 By not delineating the corporate scienter pleading rule as applicable only in 
exceptional cases and defining what those cases are, the Second circuit ruling 
encourages plaintiffs to bring cases attempting to rely on the rule by asserting only 
general allegations of scienter; in other words, exactly the kind of cases the stringent 
pleading rules are aimed at eliminating. By encouraging these types of cases, the 
corporate scienter pleading rule ignores the strong policy consideration behind the 
heightened pleading rules: that baseless suits are detrimental to the american capital 
markets system in general, and that they abuse and damage a tool—the private 
54. Id. at 196.
55. Id. at 197.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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securities suit—that is vital to maintaining integrity in the capital markets system.58 
the Second circuit’s stringent pleading requirements help to avoid abuses such as 
“the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there 
is a significant change in an issuer’s stock price, without regard to any underlying 
culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the discovery process might 
lead eventually to some plausible cause of action.”59 as a matter of simple fairness, 
the Second circuit’s stringent pleading requirements prevent plaintiffs who have 
alleged no specific facts that suggest liability on the part of an agent of the corporation 
from going on a fishing expedition through discovery.60
 the corporate scienter pleading rule announced in Dynex is incompatible with 
the rest of the Second circuit’s case law establishing strict rules for pleading scienter 
on a theory of recklessness. in Dynex, the Second circuit encourages plaintiffs to 
rely on the corporate scienter pleading rule to file complaints asserting only general 
allegations, while giving little guidance as to when, if ever, such a case could actually 
raise a strong inference of recklessness without satisfying the particularity pleading 
requirements. Dynex itself demonstrates that most of those complaints attempting to 
rely on the corporate scienter pleading rule will be analyzed under the particularized 
recklessness pleading requirements and will necessarily be dismissed for failure to 
satisfy them.
58. H.r. rep. no. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (conf. rep.); see Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 313 (recognizing the usefulness 
of meritorious private securities fraud suits as a supplement to criminal and civil penalties, as well as the 
danger that such suits will be “employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and 
individuals whose conduct conforms to the law.”); Perino, supra note 3, at 922–23 (noting that the 
purpose of the PSLra was to create procedural hurdles, including the heightened pleading standard for 
scienter, designed to reduce the damage done by frivolous suits without restricting useful meritorious 
cases); Stephen J. choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. rev. 1465, 1466–67 (2004) 
(contrasting the usefulness of securities suits as a means of disciplining corporate agents against the 
danger of frivolous suits filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys solely for settlement money).
59. H.r. rep. no. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (conf. rep.); see Perino, supra note 3, at 920 (“often cases were 
brought within days of a significant stock price drop, with apparently very little investigation into their 
merits.”); see choi supra note 58, 1466–67 (2004) (describing frivolous lawsuits to encompass both suits 
filed with no expectation of finding any evidence of culpable behavior by the defendant and suits that 
are filed solely in an attempt to extract settlement money since the cost of a trial would clearly exceed 
any possible damages award).
60. H.r. rep. no. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (conf. rep.) (quoting a witness describing a scheme where “once 
the suit is filed, the plaintiff ’s law firm proceeds to search through all of the company’s documents and 
take endless depositions for the slightest positive comment which they can claim induced the plaintiff to 
invest and any shred of evidence that the company knew a downturn was coming.”).
